Publication: On believing indirectly for practical reasons
On believing indirectly for practical reasons
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Schmidt, S. (2022). On believing indirectly for practical reasons. Philosophical Studies, 179(6), 1795–1819. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01730-0
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It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible to reasons to act. Pragmatis
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Schmidt, S. (2022). On believing indirectly for practical reasons. Philosophical Studies, 179(6), 1795–1819. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01730-0
