Publication: Does willful ignorance deflect punishment? – An experimental study
Does willful ignorance deflect punishment? – An experimental study
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Bartling, B., Engl, F., & Weber, R. A. (2013). Does willful ignorance deflect punishment? – An experimental study (No. 125; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
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This paper studies whether people can avoid punishment by remaining willfully ignorant about possible negative consequences of their actions for others. We employ a laboratory experiment, using modified dictator games in which a dictator can remain willfully ignorant about the payoff consequences of his decision for a receiver. A third party can punish the dictator after observing the dictator’s decision and the resulting payoffs. On the one hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished less if their actions lead to unfair outcomes
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Bartling, B., Engl, F., & Weber, R. A. (2013). Does willful ignorance deflect punishment? – An experimental study (No. 125; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
