Publication: Prospect theory in a dynamic game: Theory and evidence from online pay-per-bid Auctions
Prospect theory in a dynamic game: Theory and evidence from online pay-per-bid Auctions
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Brünner, T., Reiner, J., Natter, M., & Skiera, B. (2019). Prospect theory in a dynamic game: Theory and evidence from online pay-per-bid Auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 164, 215–234. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.05.032
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Abundant evidence exists that expected utility theory does not adequately describe decision making under risk. Although prospect theory is a popular alternative, it is rarely applied in strategic situations in which risk arises through individual interactions. This study fills this research gap by incorporating prospect theory preferences into a dynamic game theoretic model. Using a large field data set from multiple online pay-per-bid auction sites, the authors empirically show that their proposed model with prospect theory preferenc
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Brünner, T., Reiner, J., Natter, M., & Skiera, B. (2019). Prospect theory in a dynamic game: Theory and evidence from online pay-per-bid Auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 164, 215–234. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.05.032