Publication: Epistemic blame and the normativity of evidence
Epistemic blame and the normativity of evidence
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Schmidt, S. (2024). Epistemic blame and the normativity of evidence. Erkenntnis, 89, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00430-9
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The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge
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Citations
Schmidt, S. (2024). Epistemic blame and the normativity of evidence. Erkenntnis, 89, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00430-9
