Publication: Binding Say-on-Pay and Shareholder Value
Binding Say-on-Pay and Shareholder Value
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Wagner, A., & Wenk, C. (2026). Binding Say-on-Pay and Shareholder Value. Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 15, 123–157. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfaf010
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This paper investigates share price reactions and corporate responses to a set of policy changes regarding binding say-on-pay in Switzerland. The cross-section of stock price reactions indicates a trade-off: On the one hand, binding votes on executive compensation amounts, especially when conducted retrospectively, can help reduce agency costs by enhancing the alignment of management and shareholder interests. On the other hand, retrospective binding votes entail costs, for example, by distorting executives’ incentives for extracontra
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Wagner, A., & Wenk, C. (2026). Binding Say-on-Pay and Shareholder Value. Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 15, 123–157. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfaf010
