Publication: Ignorance and its disvalue
Ignorance and its disvalue
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Meylan, A. (2020). Ignorance and its disvalue. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 97, 433–447. https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000106
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It is commonly accepted – not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life – that ignorance is a failure of some sort. As a result, a desideratum of any ontological account of ignorance is that it must be able to explain why there is something wrong with being ignorant of a true proposition. This article shows two things. First, two influential accounts of ignorance – the Knowledge Account and the True Belief Account – do not satisfy this requirement. They fail to provide a satisfying normative account of the badness of
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Meylan, A. (2020). Ignorance and its disvalue. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 97, 433–447. https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000106