Publication: An equilibrium analysis of the Arad-Rubinstein game
An equilibrium analysis of the Arad-Rubinstein game
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Ewerhart, C., & Kaźmierowski, S. (2024). An equilibrium analysis of the Arad-Rubinstein game (No. 443; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
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Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the tie-breaking rule is allowed to be flexible. We begin by pointing out that equilibrium constructions known from the literature extend to our class of games. However, we also note that, irrespective of the tie-breaking rule, the equilibrium set is excessively large. Specifically, any pure strategy that
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D74
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Ewerhart, C., & Kaźmierowski, S. (2024). An equilibrium analysis of the Arad-Rubinstein game (No. 443; Working Paper Series / Department of Economics).
